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DRAMATIC DEVICES AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL CONTENT IN 
PLATO’S SYMPOSIUM
Carl O’Brien*
RESUMO: O Banquete de Platão serve-se de recursos dramá-
ticos diversos, tais como a história-moldura, a organização dos 
discursos e o ensino de Diotima enquanto meios de orientação 
do leitor pela mensagem filosófica subjacente, a qual inclui 
um exame do sistema socrático de educação. Os discípulos de 
Sócrates demonstram notável entusiasmo pela filosofia, mas 
parecem incapazes de distinguir o amor por Sócrates do amor 
pela sabedoria. Agatão ocupa posição de destaque: devido a um 
trocadilho com o seu nome, a jornada do jantar em sua casa se 
tornará na ascensão em direção ao Bem. Além disso, ele repre-
senta a educação sofística e poética, assim como cada um dos 
oradores representa algum tipo particular de conhecimento, o 
que implica que não se deveria simplesmente impingir pedantis-
mo a Eurixímaco, ou tomar o discurso de Aristófanes enquanto 
um interlúdio cômico. Eles formam, antes, uma complexa rede 
intertextual. Alcibíades exibe as fraquezas de um homem inábil 
ou relutante em seguir a totalidade do ensino socrático. Sua soli-
citação de ser conduzido por Agatão simboliza a incapacidade de 
encontrar o próprio caminho do Bem, ao passo que a interrupção 
da ordem bem organizada do banquete pelos boêmios lembra a 
atitude dos tiranos e de outros homens hostis à filosofia. Apesar 
dessa crítica aos estudantes de Sócrates, o Banquete finaliza 
com uma nota positiva. As ações finais de Sócrates ocupam-se 
das outras pessoas – uma crítica implícita a quem sustenta que 
a filosofia subverte os laços sociais.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Banquete – Sócrates – educação – Bem 
Introduction
Plato’s fondness for dramatic devices, whe-
ther this refers to framing stories, the use of myth 
or the employment of oracular utterances and divine 
signs, is well-known. It has also been frequently 
observed that there is a link between such literary 
artifices and the philosophical content which he 
seeks to deliver. The Symposium is a particularly 
good example of this structure in action, to such 
an extent that it could accurately be described by 
Mikhail Bakhtin as the first novel in history. He was 
not alone: Friedrich Schegel referred to the Socratic 
dialogues in general as ‘the novels of their time’. 
The Symposium merits this distinction, not because 
it is the first example of literature to employ such 
dramatic devices, but rather because it is clear 
that the author is using such devices as a means of 
conveying an underlying meaning and conditioning 
the reader’s response. The dramatic elements include 
the framing story, the arrangement of the speeches, 
Aristophanes’ hiccups, which disrupts their order, 
the lesson of Diotima, which means that the core 
philosophical content of the dialogue is delivered as 
a story within a story which has been recounted at 
third-hand and finally the interruption of Alcibiades, 
which is followed by an invasion of revellers leading 
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ABSTRACT: Plato’s Symposium uses dramatical devices, 
such as the framing story, the arrangement of the speeches 
or the lesson with Diotima, as a means of guiding the 
reader to the underlying philosophical message, which in-
cludes an examination of the system of Socratic education. 
Socrates’ acolytes display a commendable enthusiasm for 
philosophy, but seem incapable of distinguishing between 
love of Socrates and love of wisdom. Agathon occupies a 
central position: due to punning on his name, the trek to 
dinner at his house symbolises the ascent to the Good, and 
he represents sophistic and poetic education, just as all of 
the other speakers represent a particular kind of expertise, 
meaning that Eryximachus should not simply be dismissed 
as a pedant or Aristophanes’ speech regarded as a comic 
interlude. Rather, they form part of a complex intertextual 
web. Alcibiades displays the shortcomings of a man unable 
or unwilling to complete the Socratic course of study; his 
demand to be taken to Agathon symbolises his inability 
to find his way to the Good, while the interruption of the 
revellers into the orderly arrangement of the symposium 
evokes the attitude of tyrannical men and those hostile 
towards philosophy. Despite this criticism of some of So-
crates’ students, the Symposium closes on a positive note. 
Socrates’ final actions in the dialogue are other-centred; 
an implied critique of those who claim that philosophy 
undermines social ties.
KEY-WORDS: Symposium – Socrates – education – Good
to the collapse of the symposium. 
Although an attempt to treat these aspects 
can have a tendency to adopt a piecemeal approa-
ch, and create the impression that the dialogue is 
merely a series of episodes, this is something which 
I hope to avoid by treating all these elements as 
part of an overarching stragegy which Plato adopts 
to shape and inform our reading of the Symposium. 
These devices introduce a discordant element into 
the dialogue, suggesting the failure of the Socratic 
elenchus for those who abandon its pursuit pre-
maturely and highlighting the difficulties Socrates 
himself faces as an educator attempting to lead his 
youthful charges onto a virtuous path. This criticism 
applies to the other guests at the Symposium; while 
the initial impression is of a random collection of 
representatives of Athenian high society, we find 
that we are dealing with those concerned either 
with education, or more specifically those we might 
expect to be capable of providing further informa-
tion regarding love: the tragic poet (Agathon), the 
comic poet (Aristophanes), the scientist/physician 
(Eryximachus), the lover (Pausanias), the beloved 
(Phaedrus), the young man about town (Alcibiades), 
each of whom, like the philosopher Socrates himself, 
fails to provide the sort of enlightenment which we 
might expect. These discordant notes are struck 
early on in the dialogue during the course of the 
elaborate framing story which Plato constructs as 
a prelude to the philosophical investigation of the 
dialogue proper. One must, though, follow Jowett’s 
sage advice: ‘If it be true that there are more things 
in the Symposium of Plato than any commentator 
has dreamed of, it is also true that many things 
have been imagined which are not really to be found 
there’. (JOWETT, 1892, p. 524)
The Framing Story
The framing story is a Beglaubigungsapparat, 
familiar from other dialogues, which locates the 
philosophical discussion at a precise time and place, 
mentions those present at the event and establishes 
the overall reliability of the account which we are to 
hear. It happened when Glaucon and Adeimanthus 
were little, on the occasion of Agathon’s first victory. 
Apollodorus remembers it well as he has recently 
recounted the whole story to Glaucon. The problem 
here, as so often in Plato, is that discordant ele-
ments remind us that the narrative need not be so 
accurate. We never learn the name of the companion 
of Apollodorus who requests the account. We are far 
removed in both time and space from the event: it 
happened long ago and Apollodorus himself was 
not present; he learnt everything from a follower 
of Socrates, Aristodemus, who was present, and this 
remoteness makes Apollodorus’ claims of accuracy 
(by having verified certain details with Socrates, 
Symp. 173A-B) sound hollow. There are several 
speeches after Phaedrus’ which Aristodemus could 
not remember, implying an imperfect knowledge 
of the guest list and the seating arrangements. 
The recitation of the narrative itself might be seen 
as engaging in philosophy; it takes place during 
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the ascent to the city (anîon, Symp.172A2) which 
evokes Diotima’s ladder (epanîon, 211B), just as 
the descent into the Piraeus at the opening of 
the Republic evokes the return of the philosopher 
into the cave after having attained a vision of the 
Forms (CORRIGAN & GLAZOV-CORRIGAN, 2004). The 
secondary movement, the walk to Agathon’s house, 
or the house of the Good also highlights the process 
of philosophising: as Socrates comments, the good 
go of their own accord to the banquets of the Good 
(Symp.174B).
Despite this, it is clear that Socrates’ acolytes 
are inadequate philosophers. Neither Apollodorus 
nor Aristodemus seem capable of conducting an 
elenchus themselves, but simply imitate everything 
which Socrates does. Apollodorus’ unnamed com-
panion too seems incapable of practising the level 
of philosophical examination required to lead a 
virtuous life: 
…in the case of other sorts of talk – especially that 
of your wealthy money-bag friends – I am not only 
annoyed myself, but sorry for dear intimates like you, 
who think you are doing a great deal when you really 
do nothing at all. From your point of view, I daresay, 
I seem a hapless creature, and I think your thought is 
true. I, however, do not think it of you, I know it for 
sure (Symp. 173C-D).
1
 
Just as the Symposium is an account at a 
distant remove and via two informants, Apollodorus 
is an inferior version of Socrates: 
You are the same as ever, Apollodorus, – always 
defaming yourself and everyone else! Your view, I take 
it, is that all men alike are miserable, save Socrates, 
and that your own plight is the worst. How you may 
have come by your title of “crazy”, I do not know: 
though, of course, you are always like that in your way 
of speech – raging against yourself and everybody except 
Socrates (Symp. 173D). 
Apollodorus cannot even remember the 
second-hand account which he has learnt from 
Aristodemus, but rather the account which he re-
cently gave to Glaucon. His attempt at philosophy 
is limited to the mimetic and he is unable to engage 
with the account which he received, but must sim-
ply recount it in order and by rote. Socrates only 
‘always appears to be saying the same things in the 
same ways’, according to Alcibiades at 221E, but he 
is like a Silenus, who can be opened up to reveal 
deeper meaning.
Such emphasis on the accuracy or inaccuracy 
of the dialogue can be found elsewhere. In the The-
aetetus, Euclides cannot remember the philosophical 
discussion in question, since it happened so long 
in the past, but the dialogue is actually represen-
ted by an account which he made at the time and 
which will now be read out by a slave. Such frames 
can be interpreted in two opposite ways as placing 
emphasis on either the veracity or the fictitiousness 
of the account. The Theaetetus frame, though, is 
different from that of the Symposium. Euclides has 
been involved in a redrafting process, rather than 
the simple (and, as is amply indicated, imperfect 
because incomplete) mimesis of Apollodorus. Eu-
clides composes from notes which he took at the 
time, and composed a draft which he improved by 
querying Socrates on various details. This is why 
I feel that the frame of the Symposium cannot be 
simply dismissed as a typical example of Platonic 
paideia, but as a pessimistic reading of the limited 
nature of Socratic-style education, if not comple-
ted. As Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan note ‘play and 
playfulness between many levels of signification is 
definitely not alien to his style and must be taken 
into account in order for one to grasp the very te-
nor of his philosophical thinking. There is no part 
of the dialogue that is simply non-philosophical.’ 
(2004, p. 42) Socrates provides the stimulus for 
Apollodorus to arrive at the house of Agathon, 
the house of the Good, but he must enter there 
himself; Socrates, it will be remembered, pauses in 
the porch of a neighbouring house to listen to his 
daimonion. Even the dinner arrangements hint at 
the difficulties facing Socrates as an educator, when 
Agathon at Symp. 175C requests that Socrates sit 
beside him, so that he may benefit from his wisdom 
by contact, forcing Socrates to reply: ‘How fine it 
would be, Agathon…if wisdom were a sort of thing 
that could flow out of the one of us who is fuller 
1. Unless otherwise stated, all 
translations are by Lamb.
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into him who is emptier, by our mere contact with 
each other, as water will flow through wool from 
the fuller cup into the emptier.’
The Arrangement of the Speeches
The actual arrangement of the speeches on 
one level is simply as the result of a random seating 
order, but is obviously of great importance, as Plato 
continuously draws attention to it. There are four 
alterations made to the original order: 1) Agathon 
is displaced by the arrival of Socrates, 2) Eryxima-
chus must speak earlier on account of Aristophanes’ 
hiccups and 3) Agathon and Socrates are displaced 
by Alcibiades and 4) finally all of the guests are 
displaced by the invasion of the revellers. There 
are a number of means of interpreting the order of 
the speeches: the five preliminary speeches can all 
be regarded as on the same level, but inferior to 
Socrates, or each speech can be regarded as surpas-
sing the speech which preceeds it. I would reject 
such an interpretation since this would characterise 
Phaedrus as the weakest speaker, which cannot be 
the case from a Socratic perspective, since he re-
quests instruction. Additionally, it would mean that 
Agathon would be the strongest speaker, apart from 
Socrates, whereas elements of his speech can be 
viewed as a triumph of style over substance, even 
though Agathon is a central figure.
Alternative structural attempts focus on 
grouping the speeches into pairs, based upon per-
ceived similarities. So, for example, Phaedrus’ and 
Agathon’s speeches both mention one Eros, while 
Pausanias’ and Eryximachus’ mention two. One can 
also reject the claim that the speeches have any 
significance on the grounds that Aristophanes’ 
hiccups draw attention to the accidental nature of 
the arrangement. More recent scholarship tends to 
propound the notion of an intertextual web: the spe-
eches interrelate to produce a more holistic unders-
tanding of the truth which Plato is investigating. In 
this way, the Symposium becomes a recreation of 
the ideal mechanism for engaging in philosophical 
activity and goes from competitive encomiasm to 
a shared enterprise. My own preference is for the 
intertexual web interpretation, though I feel that 
the more significant speeches are from the experts; 
Eryximachus, Agathon, Aristophanes and Socrates, 
rather than the laymen, Phaedrus and Pausanias. 
However, these last two greatly enrich the dialogue, 
since they, along with Alcibiades, speak abour love 
from personal experience. The choice of eros as a 
topic for discussion raises the issue of education, 
since it becomes apparent that the lover should be 
responsible for the enobling of the beloved; in both 
cases Socrates seems to fail (although his charges 
must bear some responsibility). The result is that the 
issue of Socrates’s corruption of the youth remains 
ever present and the Symposium can be read as a 
more nuanced extension of the defence of Socrates 
in the Apology.
Eryximachus
One character who deserves detailed tre-
atment is the doctor, Eryximachus. He typically 
receives bad press and his contribution to the 
dialogue as a whole is severely underestimated. 
He is typically treated as a caricature of a medical 
professional (rather than as an accuarate historical 
portrayal of a doctor of the period). He is regarded 
as someone with a limited understanding of the 
world, who hopelessly tries to extrapolate from his 
medical training a frame of reference for subjects 
beyond the scope of his knowledge where he is 
out of his depth. Such critics argue that he knows 
nothing about love, but this does not prevent his 
pedantic pronouncements. Worse than this, he is 
simply boring; he insists on turning the discussion 
to medical matters, irrespective of the wishes of the 
rest of the company.
Such a dismissal of Eryximachus is unfair, 
inaccurate and fails to appreciate the role which 
he plays in the discussion. Eryximachus, it is true, 
has frequent recourse to his medical knowledge, 
but in this context, he is simply an example of a 
professional type, a representative of a particular 
sort of Greek wisdom. Aristophanes never seems to 
be criticised for behaving like a comic poet because 
his speech is so entertaining. Similarly Agathon with 
his polished Greek is a representative of the trage-
dians. Eryximachus does not bore the company with 
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medical details; rather this knowledge is sought out. 
His discourse on drunkenness is in response to the 
complaints of Pausanias, Aristophanes and his host, 
Agathon, regarding their hangover from the previous 
night’s carousing, and he uses his medical expertise 
to support the general mood of the gathering at 
Symp. 176. In any case, ancient doctors frequently 
wrote on the issue of symposia and drunkenness; 
the examples of Mnesitheus, Heraclides of Tarentum, 
Hippocrates and Diocles can be cited in this regard.
2 
Aristophanes requests his help to stop his hiccups 
at Symp. 185D: ‘I look to you, Eryximachus, either 
to stop my hiccough, or to speak in my stead until 
I can stop it’, and this request contains an example 
of Plato’s playfulness, since the name Erxyimachus 
literally means ‘hiccup-fighter’. Erxyimachus’ techni-
cal expertise is well-attested in the efficacy of the 
cure which he suggests. This is reinforced by the 
presentation of both Eryximachus and his father, 
Acumenus, as notable physicians at Phaedrus 268A. 
Furthermore, the criticism of Eryximachus’ 
extended medical discussion ignores the breadth of 
his knowledge which also encompasses philosophy 
and music. Indeed, he discusses music (187A-E) at 
greater length than medicine (186B-E). (EDELSTEIN, 
1945, p. 87) The primary objection one can make 
against him as a fellow guest is his decision to 
send away the flute-girl (176E); while supplying 
further ammunition to those who would make him 
a bore and a pedant, it reinforces his significance 
as the instigator of the philosophical discussion. 
It is Eryximachus who suggests praise of Eros as 
a suitable subject (176E), though admitting that 
the idea came from Phaedrus (177A). He is sym-
posiarch, along with Phaedrus, and as such all of 
the speeches are either addressed to one of them 
or they are mentioned in the conclusion or one of 
them is drawn by the speaker into the discussion. 
(EDELSTEIN, 1945, p. 95) Eryximachus, then, is not 
simply another speaker, but a major figure in the 
framework of the dialogue.
Eryximachus is also typically criticised for his 
dogmatism and his criticism of the speakers who 
preceded him. This is appropriate to the context 
and not a feature unique to him. All of the other 
speakers make some criticism of their rivals, as one 
would expect in the competitive environment of the 
symposium. So Pausanias criticises Phaedrus (180C), 
Aristophanes points out what he perceives as the 
shortcomings of both Eryximachus and Pausanias 
(189C), and Agathon (194E) and Socrates (198D) 
both criticise all of the preceding speakers, although 
Socrates does this with his usual grace (EDELSTEIN, 
1945, p. 88). Indeed, Eryximachus’ speech displays 
greater understanding than the other speeches 
with the obvious exception of Socrates’ discourse. 
He is the most philosophical of the other speakers, 
illustrated by his citation of Heraclitus at 187A: 
‘The One at variance with itself is drawn together, 
like harmony of bow or lyre.’
3
 He also mentions the 
Empedoclean theory of love and strife as responsible 
for the cohesion of the world: ‘Love is not merely 
an impulse of human souls towards beautiful men, 
but the attraction of all creatures to a great variety 
of things, which works in the bodies of all animals 
and all growths upon the earth, and practically in 
everything that is; and I have learnt how mighty 
and wonderful and universal is the sway of this god 
over all affairs both human and divine (186A). Such 
references should not be dismissed as pedantic or 
pretentious; Eryximachus is the only speaker to 
appreciate the importance of opposing forces in the 
preservation of the universe. This will be picked up 
later on by Socrates in his portrayal of Eros as the 
result of a union of opposites and his discussion of 
Eros’ desire for the opposite. 
Eryximachus is also the only speaker aware of 
Eros’ domination of all areas of human endeavour: 
‘And so not merely is all medicine governed, as I 
propound it, through the influence of this god, 
but likewise athletics and agriculture. Music also, 
as is plain to even the least curious observer, is 
in the same sort of case (187A).’ The importance 
of his speech is indicated by Socrates’ approval: 
Eryximachus is singled out as one who ‘fought 
well’ (193E-194A), whereas the others are treated 
as a group who have spoken ‘sufficiently and well’ 
(177E). Like Phaedrus, he is open to the idea of 
further instruction: his closing remarks at 188D-E: 
‘It may well be that with the best will in the world 
I have omitted many points in the praise I owe to 
Love; but any gaps which I may have left it is your 
2. Mnesitheus (Athenaeus 11, 
p. 483f = Fr. 45); Heraclides of 
Tarentum Fr. 24; Diocles Fr. 141. 
Cf. Edelstein, 1945, p. 86 n. 5.
3. Heracl. Fr. 45.
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business, Aristophanes, to fill: or if you intend some 
different manner of glorifying the god, let us hear 
your eulogy’ do not seem to have been taken into 
account by those who accuse him of dogmatism.
Eryximachus’ important role is underscored 
in other ways. At 223B, only he and Phaedrus are 
referred to by name as leaving the symposium. He 
restores order over the banquet when Alcibiades 
bursts in and threatens to take over and forces 
him to deliver a speech (214A-C). The weakness of 
Eryximachus’ comments tend to focus on his exag-
gerated claim that his medical training has given 
him an elevated insight into the nature of love: ‘the 
master-physician is he who can distinguish between 
the nobler and the baser Loves, and can effect such 
alteration that the one passion is replaced by the 
other; and he will be deemed a good practitioner 
who is expert in producing Love where it ought to 
flourish but exists not, and in removing it from 
where it should not be. Indeed he must be able 
to make friends and happy lovers of the keenest 
opponents in the body’ (186D). Such comments 
are best regarded as an ironic persona adopted for 
the amusement of the company, within the context 
of a professional’s defence of his techn. Agathon 
does the same and points out that he is following 
Eryximachus’ example.
The Poets
One of the enlightening pairs of speeches is 
that of Agathon and Aristophanes, a combination 
that is masked by the tendency to regard Aristopha-
nes’ speech as either a historical portrait or a comic 
interlude. However, Agathon’s speech follows imme-
diately after Aristophanes’, a fact which is emphasised 
by Aristophanes speaking in a position unintended 
by the original order on account of his hiccups. That 
both Agathon and Aristophanes should be considered 
a pairing is further indicated by Socrates’ debate with 
both men on whether the same poet could compose 
both comedy and tragedy. Socrates, at the end of the 
Symposium, opposes his own denial that this was 
possible at Republic Book 3, where one of the main 
weaknesses of those engaged in imitative arts is that 
they are unable to cross such genre-boundaries. It 
makes best sense when interpreted within the context 
of Diotima’s claim that the lover is able to transcend 
the boundaries of a single science (CORRIGAN & 
GLAZOV-CORRIGAN, 2004, p. 185).
The accounts of the lovers, Phaedrus and 
Pausanias, represent standard encomia of the nature 
of love within the context of the time. Eryximachus’ 
speech elevates the discussion to a more broadly-
-based scientific discussion, while Socrates acts as 
Plato’s philosophical spokesman. It is the poets who 
represent in various ways the primary opposition to 
Plato’s position. Far from being a comic interlude, 
Aristophanes represents a very real challenge to the 
Platonic conception of love. While Diotima propoun-
ds a view of love in which the lover is able to identify 
the abstract qualities underlying the beloved and so 
come to a general love of all individuals with such 
qualities, Aristophanes represents love as a primal 
desire for a single beloved which is an inherent 
part of our nature. Both views are incompatible, but 
Aristophanes’ appears more cogent, since it more 
closely corresponds to empirical evidence.
Before Agathon’s speech is delivered, Plato 
heightens our expectations regarding the content. 
Socrates claims to be worried at having to follow the 
previous speakers, highlighting the increased diffi-
culty he will be in once Agathon has spoken (194A). 
The framing story has placed Agathon in a central 
position; dinner at his house becoming an allegory 
of a philosophical journey. Agathon’s speech can 
be viewed as anticlimactic; many of philosophical 
assertions which he makes are contradicted during 
Socrates’ elenchus with him.
He represents the weakness of poetry from a 
Platonic perspective; relying on polished and refined 
Greek syntax, which merely serves as a mechanism 
for reciting traditional topoi. When Socrates pulls 
him up on this, he does at least reply ‘very likely I 
didn’t know what I was talking about then, Socrates’ 
(201B9), realising the limitations of his level of kno-
wledge. His account is the sort of thing one would 
expect from someone too heavily influenced by a so-
phistic education and falls rather flat after the hype 
surrounding it. Yet given Agathon’s centrality within 
the dialogue, he cannot be so easily dismissed. His 
importance is repeatedly underlined by Plato; not 
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least in Socrates’ choosing to recline beside him. 
His speech might appear anticlimactic to us, but it 
is the only one of the preliminary speeches to be 
greated with applause (198A). He is also privileged 
in the sense that Socrates engages in an elenchus 
with him. Finally, at the end of the dialogue, he and 
Aristophanes are the two involved in the new dis-
cussion with Socrates concerning whether the same 
man could compose comedy and tragedy. Agathon 
not only symbolises the philosophical journey; he 
provides a fixed point in space and time. Just as his 
house provides a geographical location for the event, 
his first victory provides a dramatic date (victory 
in the Lenaia in 416BC) (EMLYN-JONES, 2004, p. 
393)
4
. Plato elsewhere only provides the possibility 
to date the dramatic context so precisely when the 
dialogue concerns Socrates’ trial and its aftermath. 
(EMLYN-JONES, 2004, p. 393).
While there appears to be much that is wrong 
with Agathon’s speech, such items are concentrated 
in the opening half of the speech, rather than in 
the closing segment. Agathon’s logic is weak in his 
categorisation of Love as one of the traditional vir-
tues (196C-D) or in his claim that everyone happily 
serves Love or indeed in his definition of Love as 
moderation on account of its mastery of all pleasu-
res (when moderation is self-mastery, not mastery 
of anything else) (EMLYN-JONES, 2004, p. 395). 
Conversely, in the second half, Agathon acts as a 
precursor of Socrates, who later expands on some of 
his suggestions; such as his comment at 197A that 
whoever has Love as a teacher enjoys great success 
and his statement that Love is coveted by those 
who do not possess him is reflected in Socrates’ 
later contention that desire is for that which one 
does not have. Agathon plays a major role, since he 
represents the professional weaknesses of the poets 
and a sophistic style of education in general. He is 
not ashamed of his aporia, which he readily concedes 
without any embarrassment (and there is no sugges-
tion either on his part or amongst his friends that 
there is anything wrong with this, though perhaps 
this can be attributed to social decency; it is after 
all his party). He is primarily concerned with the 
form and effect of his speech. By this metric, his 
speech has been a resounding success and he does 
not seem troubled by the philosophical concessions 
which he cheerfully makes to Socrates (199D-201C). 
Socrates too admits that Agathon’s words were 
beautiful (201C). A Socratic education might fail, 
when students like Alcibiades fail to complete their 
course of study, but Plato banishes the possibility 
that a poetic or sophistic education, both of which 
Agathon represents, can be considered as a serious 
alternative. In their detachment from the pursuit of 
philosophical truth and their focus on rousing the 
emotions of their audience, the poets and sophists 
lack social responsibility, even if Agathon himself 
can be forgiven for such excesses. His encomium 
may have focused more on the effect it had on his 
listeners than upon argumentation, but he graciou-
sly accepts instruction from Socrates.
Socrates and Diotima
It is time now to turn to the central speech 
of the dialogue. Socrates’ preliminary remarks draw 
attention to the relationship between narrative form 
and philosophical content: he praises Agathon for 
the beauty of his speech, but points out that he 
has failed in his exposition of love. Socrates then 
claims that he will expound the truth concerning 
love, but instead of delivering the encomium which 
we expect, he describes a lesson which he received 
on the nature of love from a Mantinean priestess 
called Diotima. There are numerous advantages to 
Socrates adopting this tactic. Firstly, it allows him 
to avoid the crassness of correcting his host, Aga-
thon, at his own dinner-party in celebration of his 
recent dramatic victory and prevents Socrates from 
claiming an erotic wisdom of his own, but allows 
him to speak from a position of knowledge while 
not compromising his typical claim of ignorance 
(though erotic matters are one of the few things 
he claims to know about). Diotima is also differen-
tiated from the other speakers: as a priestess, she 
speaks with a divinely-sanctioned authority and as 
a woman she exposes the limited perspective of 
the earlier speeches which, with the exception of 
Aristophanes, privilege male homosexual love. It 
also allows the introduction of the Penia myth, a 
use of mythology which is not really in character for 
4. Agathon has ‘only’ won the 
Lenaia, although Socrates’ claim 
that he was victorious before 
30,000 Greeks, rather than a more 
likely figure of 14,000 Athenians, 
suggests that he has won the 
Greater Dionysia. cf. Emlyn-Jones, 
2004, p. 397.
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Plato’s Socrates. The Penia myth is an example of 
hyponoia (underthought), the sort of allegory that 
Plato frequently rejects.
5
Diotima has impressive qualifications: she de-
layed the arrival of the plague at Athens by ten years. 
Despite this, her account of love is perplexing and 
perhaps disingenuous. By Platonic sleight of hand, 
she transforms a discussion of eros into an analysis 
of desire more generally. Even though Socrates en-
dorses her account, there is some subtle criticism of 
the manner in which she proceeds: at 208C1, she is 
compared to an accomplished sophist. Her principal 
claim is that the primary human desire is directed 
at immortality, but that since this is impossible to 
attain, it settles at some suitable substitute, such 
as the production of offspring (206): 
Every mortal thing is preserved in this way; not by 
keeping it exactly the same for ever, like the divine, 
but by replacing what goes off or is antiquated with 
something fresh, in the semblance of the original. 
Through this device, Socrates, a mortal thing partakes 
of immortality, both in its body and in all other respects; 
by no other means can it be done. So do not wonder if 
everything naturally values its own offshoot; since all 
are beset by this eagerness and this love with a view to 
immortality (Symp. 208A-B). 
This perpetuation of oneself through one’s 
offspring is understandable. As Konstan points out, 
such offspring can be conceived as having a similar 
relation to us as younger versions of ourself existing 
at earlier stages of our lives (KONSTAN, 1998, p. 262). 
In the case of homosexual males, this desire seems to 
be directed towards the production of literature as well 
as the virtue of the beloved, a twofold desire which 
can be reconciled if one imagines that the object of 
the literature created is the virtuous upbringing of the 
boy who is loved. This helps reinforce the importance 
of the lover as an educator. In both contexts, we shall 
see, Socrates appears to display shortcomings.
Alcibiades
While discordant elements have been intro-
duced throughout the course of the dialogue, it is 
really only with the arrival of Alcibiades that Plato 
presents us with the key to decode the criticism 
of Socratic education. Socrates, despite his best 
efforts, is unable to improve Alcidiades, who claims 
at Symp. 216: 
For he compels me to admit that sorely deficient 
as I am, I neglect myself while I attend to the affairs 
of Athens. So I withhold my ears perforce as from the 
Sirens, and make off as fast as I can, for fear that I 
should go on sitting beside him till old age was upon 
me. And there is one experience I have in the presence 
of this man alone, such as nobody would expect in 
me – to be made to feel ashamed by anyone; he alone 
can make me feel it. For he brings home to me that I 
cannot disown the duty of doing what he bids me, but 
that as soon as I turn from his company I fall a victim 
to the favours of the crowd. So I take a runaway’s leave 
of him and flee away; when I see him again I think of 
these former admissions, and am ashamed. Often I could 
wish he had vanished from this world; yet again, should 
this befall, I am sure I should be more distressed than 
ever; so I cannot tell what to do with the fellow at all.
The weakness of the Socratic system of 
education is that it can lead one to a realisation 
of the error of one’s ways, but appears incapable 
of instilling autonomy in the student who has a 
limited desire to continue his studies. Socrates is 
an intellectualist: one has only to realise that what 
one desires is morally wrong in order to correct one’s 
desires, but Alcibiades challenges such a viewpoint. 
His problem is not a lack of correct belief, but his 
willingness to yield to his appetites, as well as his 
recidivism.
Alcibiades’s description of his attempt to se-
duce Socrates famously evokes the Penia myth. Penia 
would be unable to seduce Poros under normal cir-
cumstances, but seizes her opportunity when Poros 
is inebriated. Similarly Alcibiades detains Socrates 
after dinner and persuades him to stay the night 
(217E). There is an inversion, though, as Alcibiades’ 
attempted seduction fails. Socrates is criticised for 
his failings as a lover, when in reality he behaves in 
an appropriate manner, rejecting the younger man’s 
advances. This abstinence is described as hubris, 
5. E.g. at Crat. 407A; Rep. 378D; 
Phaedr. 229cff. Cf. Corrigan & 
Glazov-Corrigan, 2004, p. 123.
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when doing the reverse, i.e. taking advantage of 
Alcibiades, would deserve this charge. Criticism 
is also directed at Socrates’ apparent detachment 
from his companions: ‘All these possessions he 
counts as nothing worth, and all of us as nothing, 
I assure you, he spends his whole life in chaffing 
and making game of his fellow-men’ (Symp. 216E), 
an accusation hinted at during his military career, 
when he marches about barefoot on the ice, while 
the other soldiers complain of the cold, interpreted 
in some quarters as a mark of disdain for his military 
companions (220C).
Alcibiades is a further example of the power 
of love, revealing both his anger against Socrates 
in his threats of revenge and also admiration in his 
wish to crown Socrates’ ‘wonderful head’ (213D-E). 
This love could have been beneficial, since coupled 
with Socrates’ guidance, it led him to approach the 
study of philosophy: ‘Now I have been bitten by 
a more painful creature, in the most painful way 
that one can be bitten: in my heart or my soul or 
whatever one is to call it, I am stricken and stung 
by his philosophic discourses, which adhere more 
fiercely than any adder when once they lay hold 
of a young and not ungifted soul and force it to 
do or say whatever they will’ (Symp. 217E-218A). 
That even Alcibiades appreciates the importance 
of love as motivating one to turn to philosophy is 
illustrated by his subsequent comments at Symp. 
218A-B, when he names each member of the group 
as suitable confidants of his erotic account, because 
they have all had their share of ‘philosophic frenzy’.
Alcibiades fails to complete his course of 
study, illustrating the appeal of the idealised love of 
the individual recounted in Aristophanes’ speech. He 
chases Socrates, rather than the underlying quality 
which causes the attraction, wisdom. (In Socrates’ 
case, physical appearance cannot conceivably be 
advanced as the cause of the attraction). Despite 
his good intentions, he lacks autonomy: ‘take me to 
Agathon’, he cries when he enters, as he is unable 
to find his way alone to the Good.
This situation is not solely the result of 
Alcibiades’ philotimia. At Rep. VII 538C6-539A3, 
there is an unusual condemnation of the Socratic 
elenchus:
Socrates: We hold from childhood certain convictions 
about just and fine things, we’re brought up with them 
as with our parents, we obey and honour them.
 
Glaucon: Indeed we do.
Socrates: However, there are other ways of living, 
opposite to these, possessing pleasures that flatter 
the soul and attract it to themselves, but which don’t 
persuade sensible people, who continue to honour and 
obey the conviction of their fathers.
Glaucon: That’s right.
Socrates: And then a questioner comes along and 
asks someone of this sort, ‘What is the beautiful?’ And, 
when he answers what he has heard from the traditional 
lawgiver, the argument refutes him and by refuting him 
often and in many places shakes him from his convic-
tions, and makes him believe that the beautiful is no 
more beautiful than ugly, and the same with the just, 
the good, and the things he honoured most. What do 
you think his attitude will be then to honouring and 
obeying his earlier convictions?
Glaucon: Of necessity, he won’t honour or obey them 
in the same way.
Socrates: Then when he no longer honours and obeys 
those convictions, and can’t discover true ones, will he 
be likely to adopt any other way of life than that which 
flatters him?
Glaucon: No, he won’t.
Socrates: And so, I suppose, from being law-abiding 
he becomes lawless.
Glaucon: Inevitably. (trans. Reeve)
This illustrates the same sort of problem which 
confronts the Alcibiades of the Symposium; the So-
cratic elenchus, despite raising an awareness in him 
of the error in which he has led his life, is unable 
to place any check on him. While this seems to be 
progress of a sort, the Republic passage leads one to 
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have doubts. Belief in the traditions of the lawgiver 
would be preferable, since it provides some curb on 
immorality. Certainly the accusation that Socrates 
corrupted the youth lingers in the background, as 
one might expect in a dialogue which treats of both 
eros and education. This is a justification of figures 
such as Apollodorus and Aristodemus, who while 
they fail to achieve a high degree of philosophical 
virtue at least have some element of morality, even 
if provided in the form of mimetic activity.
The end of the banquet
The failure of the Socratic elenchus to lead 
one to virtue, if the course of education is not follo-
wed to completion, is reinforced by the degeneration 
at the end of the banquet: ‘…when suddenly a great 
crowd of revellers arrived at the door, which they 
found just opened for someone who was going out. 
They marched straight into the party and seated 
themselves: the whole place was in an uproar and, 
losing all order, they were forced to drink a vast 
amount of wine’ (Symp. 223A-B). This movement 
from the order of the encomiastic speeches to the 
typical activity of the symposium (which had been 
delayed with the banishment of the flute girl) evokes 
the revellers who destroy philosophy at Rep. 500: 
‘Think this also, then, namely that an intolerance 
of the many toward philosophy is by those outsiders 
who come to philosophy, where they do not belong, 
like a band of revellers. They are continually abusing 
each other and being quarrelsome, they invariably 
make their speeches about men, which is least suited 
to philosophy.’ (Rep. 500B1-6, trans. Corrigan and 
Glazov-Corrigan).
Alcibiades too was a reveller unsuited to 
philosophy whose ad hominem remarks concerning 
Socrates were inappropriate for the forum in whi-
ch they were delivered. The revellers are like the 
tyrant and his fellow-revellers in the Republic; they 
destroy the collaborative nature of the symposium, 
where the rule had previously been that each guest 
should drink according to his pleasure and as much 
as he wanted, whereas they force the guests to 
drink copious amounts of wine. The revellers are 
closely linked to Alcibiades, as well as the notion of 
tyranny; he too bursts into the symposium uninvited 
and in a drunken state. At Rep. 491B-495B, he is 
an example of someone who might have become 
a philosopher-king, but this potential was never 
actualised because his Socratic-style education was 
prematurely interrupted.
The second time revellers are mentioned in the 
Republic is in connecton with the tyrant who with 
his fellow-revellers is like a parasite on his father’s 
estate (568E). The revellers of the Symposium 
are similarly tyrannical in their treatment of the 
guests. It is no coincidence that the disruption of 
the revellers reminds one of the earlier disruption 
of Alcibiades, a man of tyrannical nature, whose 
attempt to impose his will on the company is only 
defeated by the moderation of Eryximachus, a further 
reminder of the manner in which Socrates failed to 
inculcate virtue in him.
Conclusion
The Socratic elenchus is not without value. It 
can convince us of the pointlessness of our current 
behaviour. But it alone is incapable of leading us 
towards virtue, a point which Plato makes abun-
dantly clear in the Symposium. The difficulty with 
Socratic education is not that it is ineffective in 
making its pupils unaware of their deficiencies, but 
rather that it forces the student to choose between 
abstract ideals and political engagement. Alcibia-
des’ failing, as he admits, is due to his philotimia. 
Not just Alcibiades, but all of the Socratic acolytes 
of the Symposium, Agathon, Aristodemus, as well 
as Apollodorus in the framing story, confuse the 
desire for wisdom with the eros of Socrates. The 
Symposium is a more nuanced defence of Socrates 
on the charge of corrupting the youth than that of 
the Apology. Socrates might have failed Alcibiades, 
but that is because, as we learn from the Republic, 
not everyone has the sort of soul that is capable of 
engaging in philosophy. Furthermore, Alciades must 
take responsibility for not pursing his course of study 
to completion. Alcibiades, Agathon, Apollodorus 
and Aristodemus are convinced by Socrates that 
their lives are not worth living, but without the 
insights afforded by philosophical activity, they are 
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unable to live a morally correct life in an autono-
mous fashion, the only sort of life that can be just 
in a stable manner. The doctrines propounded by 
Diotima represent a standard of truth (since they 
are divinely-sanctioned) beyond that possessed by 
Socrates, but from which those who are only capable 
of mimetic activity, rather than contemplation of 
the Forms, are excluded.
A further device used in the dialogue is myth, 
which pervades the entire structure. Pausanias’ 
speech alerts us to the cynical use to which myth 
can be put in his criticism of Orpheus’ failure to die 
for Eurydice, whereas Alcestis had died for Admetus. 
Since the analogy is false, it reminds us that myth 
can easily be used to mislead.
6
 The main challenge 
to the philosophical vision of the dialogue, Aris-
tophanes’ speech, is presented in the form of an 
aetiological myth. The philosophical programme is 
likewise presented in mythic form, with the account 
of the relationship between Poverty and Resource. 
We might wish to regard the entire dialogue as a 
myth; it does after all contain the sort of orality 
typical of myth: note Apollodorus’ frequent ‘he said 
that he said’ and emphasis on accuracy, coupled with 
other more strongly mythical elements, such as the 
divine revelation experienced by the hero Socrates 
from his daimonion, and the fantastical characters 
encountered, even if at a distance. I refer not just 
to the priestess Diotima, or Poros and Penia, but the 
strange globular humans described by Aristophanes. 
A detailed analysis of Plato’s use of myth is clearly 
beyond the scope of this paper. It is worth noting, 
however, that such myths allow Plato to deliver sta-
tements which he would not perhaps wish to commit 
to and the employment of myth in this manner is an 
extension of the dialogue form, allowing a complex 
intertexual web to be developed, even if Plato guides 
us to what is the correct interpretation.
How are we expected to interpret this criti-
cism of the elenchus or of those who are initiated 
in the elenchus, but never really understand its 
purpose? Perhaps the Symposium may be viewed 
as a defence of Socrates, which is more nuanced 
than the Apology in pointing out the shortcomings 
of his educational system, but defending him on 
charges of corruption. After all, he resists the flirta-
tious advances of Agathon and Alcibiades. Socrates 
proceeds beyond the level of wisdom that can be 
attained in the elenchus, but the wisdom he receives 
is represented as being revealed, by the daimonion 
and by Diotima, not attained through philosophical 
discussion. Alcibiades mentions the images which 
he keeps hidden within (216E5-217A2), but images, 
as we know from the Republic 517D, only consist of 
second-order wisdom.
The closing of the Symposium is at least so-
mewhat hopeful. Before Socrates leaves he makes 
sure that his sleeping friends are comfortable (Symp. 
223D); if the philosopher is incapable of leading 
others to virtue, he can still practice it himself by 
exhibiting a social consciousness. This is similar to 
Socrates’ behaviour at the closing of the Phaedo, 
where his final words are ‘We must sacrifice a cock 
to Asclepius’. The obvious interpretation is as an 
offering on his own behalf for being relieved of 
the agony of hemlock. It is, however, possible to 
read this as a sacrifice for Plato’s speedy recovery 
from a cold, since illness was the reason alleged for 
Plato’s absence on the last day. The final actions at 
the banquet and indeed of Socrates’ life are other-
-centred and so the Symposium, even if not a truly 
robust defence of the Socratic educational system, 
is a reproach to those who present philosophy as 
a threat to the ties which bind society together.
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